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Iain Hamilton Grant
Prospects for Post-Copernican
Dogmatism: The Antinomies of
Transcendental Naturalism
For it is not because there is thinking that there is being, but 
rather because there is being that there is thinking. 
Schelling1 
[T]he fundamental error of dogmatism [...][is to] search outside 
the I in order to discover the ultimate ground of all that is in 
and for the I.
Fichte2 
What is the dogmatism against which transcendental 
philosophy launched its Copernican revolution? Since 
Kant’s invention of the thing-in-itself, we are apt to think 
dogmatism in terms of an access problem,3 and therefore 
to conclude that any philosophy is dogmatic that, through 
insufficient attention to its own conditioning, denies that 
there is an access problem. Yet characterising dogmatism as 
1. F.W.J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling, 14 vols (Stuttgart und 
Augsburg: Cotta, 1856-61), vol. XIII, 161 n., trans. B. Matthews, The Grounding of 
Positive Philosophy (New York: SUNY, 2007), 203 n.
2. J.G. Fichte (1971) J.G. Fichtes sämmtliche Werke (hereafter: W), ed. I.H. Fichte, 8 vols 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), vol. IV, 174, trs. D. Breazeale and G. Zöller, The 
System of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 165.
3. For an excellent recent account of the access problem, see Chapter One of Quentin 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude (London: Continuum, 2008).
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Schelling’s claim above: it is a transcendental argument in 
that it stipulates what conditions the possibility of thinking 
without reducing these conditions to any given or particular 
domain of objects. Hence Kant’s having noted, with regard 
to Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, that ‘tran-
scendental idealism is realism in an absolute sense’ (1993, 
255). In accordance with this absolute realism, Schelling’s 
thesis stems from his ontological naturalism:7 being is the 
necessary condition of thinking and not vice versa. 
The point to note is that neither claim is inherently 
inconsistent, both are transcendental, and accordingly, that 
transcendental positions are themselves open to counterpo-
sitions. Given this, in what follows, we shall argue that tran-
scendental philosophy is itself a dogmatism8 on the basis of 
the applicability of three criteria specified by transcendental 
what Kant sought by way of the ‘ether proofs’ in the Opus postumum, trans. by E. 
Förster, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 62-99. Transcendental 
philosophy is then defined as the ‘system of ideas, which are problematic (not 
assertoric) in themselves […] but must nevertheless be thought as possible forces 
affecting the rational subject’ (ibid., 250), necessitating a dynamica generalis (ibid., 224) 
to ground both the system of objects and the system of ideas.
7. ‘Anything whose conditions simply cannot be given in nature, must be absolutely 
impossible’ (Schelling, Werke III, 571). Although it could be argued that the ‘positive 
philosophy’ of the Grounding is incompatible with the ‘negative philosophical’ theses 
of the System of Transcendental Idealism, this would be to disguise the extent to which 
Schelling’s naturalism is precisely the kind of ‘absolute realism’ with which Kant 
identifies ‘transcendental idealism’.
8. As indeed Fichte claims in the ‘Review of Anesidemus’: ‘the [Dogmatic] system holds 
open the possibility that we might someday be able to go beyond the boundary of 
the human mind, whereas the Critical system proves that such progress is absolutely 
impossible, and it shows that the thought of a thing possessing existence and specific 
properties in itself and apart from any faculty of representation is a piece of whimsy, 
a pipe dream, a nonthought. And to this extent the Humean system is sceptical and 
the Critical system is dogmatic – and indeed negatively so’ (W I, 16; Eng trans. by 
D. Breazeale in Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988, 70-71).
access-positivism does little to define it positively, providing 
only a formal regression to inhibit speculative or rational 
egress beyond reflection, as the Fichte citation above makes 
sun-clear. Nevertheless, the Fichtean egress-prohibition has 
latterly been posited as a positive criterion of ‘philosophi-
cally effective’ transcendental arguments:
The transcendental argument must not invalidly infer objective 
and or unrestricted conclusions from purely subjective and/or 
merely parochial premises.4
Again, following Fichte, this criterion is expressly designed 
to counter any claim to a ‘transcendental naturalism’, which 
comes close, as Bell claims, to an oxymoron.5 It follows 
from the above criterion that the only valid transcenden-
tal argument is one that demonstrates and asserts the 
parochial subjectivism of its premises. What is striking is 
that the double assertion of subjectivity and parochialism is 
asserted against the rest of being or nature. We must ask, 
however, whether the Bell-Fichte subjective parochialism 
thesis does in fact exhaustively define transcendentalism, 
so that to reject the one is to dismiss the viability of the 
other, and thus to assert that there can be no other basis for 
transcendental philosophy. If this is so, transcendentalism’s 
parochialism is as much the grounds for its rejection as for 
its putative value. If not, we cannot conclude a transcen-
dental naturalism to be oxymoronic.6 Consider for example 
4. D. Bell, ‘Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalistic Anti-Realism’, in R. 
Stern (ed.) Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999),189-210, at 192.
5. Ibid., 194.
6. The prospect of a naturalistically grounded transcendental philosophy is precisely 
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Since (3) can itself be construed as satisfying (2), it may 
be subsumed under it. Our point in its separate statement 
is threefold. Firstly, to highlight the crucial role played 
by ‘things’ not only in the determination of the nature 
of dogmatism, as above, but also in the development of 
transcendental philosophy’s ontology, for which the concept 
‘thing-in-itself’ asserts only the most elementary determi-
nation of existents; but transcendental philosophy is itself 
dogmatic when it concludes that therefore that they exist at 
all, and that this is how being is, as when, for instance, 
it asserts that ‘concepts of relation presuppose things 
which are absolutely [schlechthin] given, and without these 
are impossible’.12 That is, the condition of possibility of 
objects of intuition – even of their distinction – is simply 
‘things absolutely given’. At this point, transcendental 
philosophy, whose ‘supreme concept […] is the division 
into the possible and the impossible’, can avoid dogmatic 
ontological commitment only at the cost of antithesis: 
Thus the object of a concept to which no assignable intuition 
whatsoever corresponds is = nothing. That is, it is a concept 
without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be 
reckoned among the possibilities, although they must not for 
that reason be declared to be also impossible.13
The ‘things absolutely given’ on which the objects of 
intuition depend are neither possible nor impossible, and 
is thus quite arbitrarily set up as the absolutely highest conception. In the critical 
system, a thing is what is posited in the self; in the dogmatic, it is that wherein the 
self is itself posited’ (Fichte W I, 119-120; SK, 117).
12. CPR: A284/B340.
13. CPR A290/B346-7.
philosophers for the identification of dogmatism. These 
criteria are: 
C.1 Logical: the susceptibility of dogmatic systems to 
internally consistent but antinomic counter-systems.9
C.2 Metaphysical: the attempt to provide a ground or cause 
of beings external to the I, or to satisfy the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason;10 and
C.3 Ontological: the thesis that beings are things or 
objects.11
9. ‘[Reason, in] its dogmatic employment [...] lands us in dogmatic assertions to 
which other assertions, equally specious, can always be opposed’ (Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1958, B22-3; hereafter 
CPR). ‘[I]n the dogmatic procedure of reason […] unavoidable contradictions of 
reason with itself have long since undermined the authority of every metaphysical 
system yet propounded’ (CPR: A10/B23-4). In ‘the dispute between the idealist and 
the dogmatist […] reason gives us no principle of choice [… and n]either of these 
two systems can directly refute its opposite’ (Fichte W I, 429-432; trans. by P. Heath 
and J. Lachs, The Science of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; 
hereafter SK, 12-14).
10. While metaphysics, ‘as science […] has to deal […] only with itself and the 
problems which arise entirely from within itself, and which are imposed upon it by 
its own nature, not by the nature of things which are distinct from it’ (CPR: B23), 
‘dogmati[sm] claim[s] acquaintance with the constitution of the object fuller than that 
of the counter-assertion’ (CPR: A388). See also Fichte W IV, 174; System of Ethics, trans. 
and ed. by Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 165: ‘[T]he fundamental error of dogmatism [...][is to] search outside 
the I in order to discover the ultimate ground of all that is in and for the I’. Wayne 
Martin confirms this diagnosis in his Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte’s Jena 
Project (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 37: ‘dogmatists are not identified 
simply as those who assert that things-in-themselves exist; rather they are those who 
assert that things in themselves constitute the ground of experience’.
11. ‘[D]ogmatic enquiry concern[s] things (objects), [whereas] a critical enquiry concern[s] 
the limits of my possible knowledge’ (CPR: A758/B786). Dogmatism thus ‘requires 
an insight into the nature of the object such that we can maintain the opposite of what 
the proposition has alleged in regard to this object [...] claiming acquaintance with the 
constitution of the object fuller than that of the counter-assertion’ (CPR A388). ‘Any 
philosophy is [...] dogmatic, when it equates or opposes any thing to the self as such; 
and this it does in appealing to the supposedly higher concept of a thing (ens), which 
grant.indd   4-5 28/12/08   13:53:05
COLLAPSE V
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Grant – Post-Copernican Dogmatism
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
words, that ‘the I is a thing’.15 Such arguments – properly 
parochial, in Bell’s sense – highlight the implicit assertion 
that an argument is transcendental if and only if it avoids 
dogmatic assertion and therefore susceptibility to counter-as-
sertion (‘things-in-themselves do/do not exist’). Such tran-
scendentalisms therefore tend to propose a metaphysics 
without ontology. The third and final reason for the initial 
distinction is therefore to raise the question as to whether 
this is possible. Dogmatisms, by contrast, argue that any 
consistent metaphysics is an ontology, and any consistent ontology is 
a metaphysics.
Consider a metaphysical problem such as causality. 
When Kant examines self-organisation in the third Critique, 
he makes precisely the claim that its ubiquity in experience 
cannot warrant any assertion or denial of its existence in 
nature. Yet this ‘problematic’ address to natural causality 
nevertheless finds that it is ‘necessary for reason to think’ 
that ‘matter can receive more and other forms than it 
can get through mechanism’.16 Rational necessity avoids 
ontological commitment if and only if it does not entail 
that the theses concerning matter and causation so neces-
sitated are not theses concerning matter and causation at all, 
but only reason; or, in other words, if the thesis, although 
rationally necessary, is contradictory. If the rational necessity 
so identified is not to be contradictory, then they are indis-
sociably ontological theses. In other words, a resolutely 
15. Martin, Idealism and Objectivity, op. cit., 36-7.
16. I. Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften (Henceforth Ak.), ed. Königlich Preussischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Riemer, later Walter de Gruyter, 
1900-), vol. V, 411; trans. W.S. Pluhar, Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1987).
therefore not susceptible of a transcendental investigation 
that cannot deny their existence. The very essence of the 
dialectic, or the unavoidable errors entailed in reason’s own 
nature, we might say. Yet as Kant’s naturalistic inquiries 
continue (the analysis of fundamental forces in the Metaphys-
ical Foundations, for example; that work’s assuaging of Kant’s 
doubts concerning chemistry as a science, and its possible 
applicability to emergent neuroscience; or more explicitly, 
the ‘ether proofs’ from the Transition from Metaphysics to 
Physics),14 this possible-impossible determination that there are 
things becomes increasingly open to dispute: perhaps things 
are not ‘absolutely given’, but forces assume ontological and 
explanatory priority over things. At issue here is the suscep-
tibility of parochial (in Bell’s sense) transcendentalisms to 
naturalistically driven ontological change. By criterion (1), 
then, the revealed contestability of a thing-based ontology 
demonstrates the transcendental philosophy’s propensity 
for dogmatism.
The second reason for the initial separation of condition 
(3) from (2) is to accommodate a recent argument made 
by Wayne Martin concerning Fichte’s identification of 
dogmatists  not ‘simply as those who assert that things-in-
themselves exist’ but rather as ‘those who assert that things-
in-themselves constitute the ground of experience’ or, in other 
14. See Kant, Aus Soemmering, Über das Organ der Seele, Ak. XII, 33-7, trans. by Anulf 
Zweig as ‘From Soemmmering’s On the organ of the soul’ in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, 
History and Education, ed. by Gunter Zöller and Robert Louden (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 219-226; and Alexander Ruerger, ‘Brain water, 
the ether, and the art of constructing systems’, Kant-Studien 86, 1995: 26-40. The 
Transition between Metaphysics and Physics was the working title by which what became 
Kant’s Opus postumum was contemporarily known (cf. Schelling SW VI, 8).
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problematic metaphysics must either satisfy the principle 
of sufficient reason, or break the law of non-contradiction. 
Neither, for the same reason, can ontology be separated 
from metaphysics unless the latter does not concern being 
at all. If it does not, it can only concern not-being, and 
is then not metaphysics, but meontology. If it does, then 
the distinction is untenable. Or ontology is not concerned 
with being, but with the reason-of-being, its logos. Such an 
account must either again face the problems encountered 
by Kant’s ‘rational necessity’, or the reason-of-being must 
become the sole focus of ontological enquiry. This is why 
many of the immediate post-Kantians understood the tran-
scendental undertaking as a ‘critique of natural cognition’17 
or of the ‘natural antithetic’;18 that is, an inquiry into the 
nature of reason itself.
It is precisely this that Schelling’s thesis about being 
denies. For it asserts not only that being is the necessary 
condition of thinking, but also that being is first necessary in 
order that there be thinking; being is the cause and ground 
of thinking, so that the Sufficient Reason for thinking is 
indistinguishable from ontology. Schelling’s is, on this 
reading, a transcendental dogmatism, specifying conditions 
of possibility by satisfying criteria (1) and (2) above. As to 
the non-separable criterion (3), Schelling will indeed deny, 
following from the force-ontologies developed by early 
experiments in electromagnetism, that ‘things’ can provide 
an adequate ontological basis for either the natural sciences 
or for speculative naturalism. If this is taken to mean that 
17. Schelling, Werke XI, 526.
18. CPR: A407/B434.
any ontological thesis resting on forces rather than things is 
for that reason non-dogmatic, then the difference between 
transcendental and dogmatic naturalisms rests on contingent 
differences in the ontologies of the natural sciences.
The dilemma initially facing a transcendental naturalism 
is accordingly that it must either assert determination by 
contingent entities of whatever nature (things, forces) or 
assert parochialism and deny that even in those of its theses 
that putatively address nature, no such address takes place 
insofar as the ‘nature’ in question is phenomenal only. The 
problem with this perhaps over-familiar claim, for those 
of us steeped in Kantian lore, is that there is an implicit 
assertion that nature as it is in itself is separable from nature 
kat’ anthropon, as Kant says – nature as it appears for us. For 
this asserts in turn both that phenomenal nature is not nature, 
which therefore transcendental philosophy does not and cannot 
address. This is exactly the problem that Kant encounters 
when he attempts the transition, firstly, from the dogmatic 
naturalism of his pre-critical works; and secondly, from 
metaphysics to physics in his final accounts of transcen-
dental philosophy. If the Copernican revolution does not 
resolve this problem, then the problems Kant encountered 
remain ours: How, if at all, is a nondogmatic account of the 
relation of reason to nature possible?
grant.indd   8-9 28/12/08   13:53:06
COLLAPSE V
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Grant – Post-Copernican Dogmatism
11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
1. EvEry ConsistEnt Dogmatism is a naturalism
How then is the Critical system different from what was 
previously described as the Humean one? The difference 
consists entirely in this: the Humean system holds open the 
possibility that we might someday be able to go beyond the 
boundary of the human mind, whereas the Critical system 
proves that such progress is absolutely impossible, and it shows 
that the thought of a thing possessing existence and specific 
properties in itself and apart from any faculty of representation 
is a piece of whimsy, a pipe dream, a nonthought. And to this 
extent the Humean system is sceptical and the Critical system 
is dogmatic.19
If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines, 
antithetic may be taken as meaning not dogmatic assertions 
of the opposite, but the conflict of the doctines of seemingly 
dogmatic knowledge in which no one assertion can establish 
superiority over the other.20
It would be a matter of considerable irony that a 
Copernican revolution in philosophy should have put paid 
to the project of a Universal Natural History – were it true. It 
does not, however; yet this is precisely what it is considered 
to have achieved: with having put an end to worries about 
how to adequate intellect to thing, since things must now 
instead comply with intellect. Yet how is any ‘unthinged’ 
naturalism to survive the revolutionary injunction? Are 
such ‘things’ reducibly those that are intellect-compliant, or 
19. Fichte, Werke I, 16; Early Philosophical Writings, ed. and tr. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), 70-71.
20. CPR: A420/B448.
are all things so? Must they be made so? Of necessity or by 
reconstruction? If the occasion for the revolution is that it 
has proven impossible to integrate reason with nature as it 
is in itself, what becomes of the problem of the integration 
of reason and nature after it?
It is immediately evident that not only does the problem 
of nature not disappear from the transcendental philosophy, 
but also that, as the critical project progresses, it resumes the 
central role it enjoyed under Kant’s precritical or dogmatic-
naturalist period. The engagement with chemistry in the 
first Critique, which persisted long afterward;21 the problem 
of the teleological judgment of nature with regard to the 
actuality of self-organising beings in the third. But nothing 
makes this cohabitation of dogmatic naturalism with 
transcendental philosophy more immediate than Kant’s 
final, unfinished project, known under the title Transition 
from Metaphysics to Physics,22 with its ether deductions and 
its attempt to square transcendental deduction with 
ontogenesis.23
21. For a survey of Kant’s chemism, see M. Lequan, La chemie selon Kant (Paris: PUF, 
2000). On Kant and the sciences more generally, see M. Friedman, Kant and the 
Exact Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), E. Watkins (ed.) Kant 
and the Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and M. Friedman and A. 
Nordmann (eds), The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: MIT, 
2006). For a substantial philosophical account of the persistence of naturalism in 
the critical philosophy, see J. Edwards, Substance, Force and the Possibility of Knowledge 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), and for the naturalism in the Opus 
postumum, E. Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000). For my own account of the conflict between somatism and field physics 
in Kant’s philosophy of nature, see Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, 2nd edition 
(London: Continuum, 2008).
22. Schelling, Werke VI, 8: ‘In the year 1801 he [Kant] was still labouring, in those 
few hours in which his power of thinking remained free, on a work: Transition from 
Metaphysics to Physics which, had age allowed him to complete it, would doubtless have 
been of the greatest interest.’
23. What I have in mind here is the Transition’s discussions of ‘how matter becomes 
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Allowing that the Copernican revolution was expressly 
undertaken to eradicate (at least Kant’s) dogmatic 
naturalism; and acknowledging also that the problem Kant 
held dogmatism incapable of resolving is the integration of 
reason and nature into a single and consistent philosophi-
cal system; then the purpose of the critical philosophy is to 
prepare a Transcendental resolution of reason and nature. 
The beginnings of this can be seen in the first Critique’s 
account of nature as ‘the dynamical whole of all appearances’, 
as opposed to ‘world’, which designates ‘the mathemati-
cal sum-total’ thereof.24 Dynamics is invariably the means 
whereby the Transcendental philosophy undertakes to 
avoid the fate of dogmatic naturalism without eliminating 
nature. Force-fields provide, by disputing criterion (3), 
above, egress from dogmatism without sacrificing nature, 
while the dynamical categories enable a reconstruction of 
reason as itself a dynamical and productive system. In the 
overt transcendental naturalism of the ether deductions, 
it will finally integrate freedom with natural causality in 
a single, necessary and a priori, physical medium, long 
after the failure of the third Critique’s analogical attempt to 
achieve the same end. Of the ether, Kant writes that
the question is whether it is to be regarded, not just as a hypo-
thetical material, in order to explain certain appearances, but a 
real world-material – given a priori by reason and counting as 
a principle of the possibility of the experience of the system 
of moving forces [...] The existence of this material, and the 
a physical body’ (Kant, Ak. XXI, 476-7). I discuss this in Philosophies of Nature after 
Schelling (London: Continuum, 2008): 59-81.
24. CPR: A418-9/B446.
necessity of its a priori presupposition, I now prove a priori in 
the following manner.25
With this, Kant seems to condemn his physics to 
the same fate as his geometry: changes in the sciences 
apparently undermine the a priori necessities Kant ascribes 
to their theses. At the same time, therefore, the transcen-
dental project in general is opened to charges of dogmatism 
on the grounds of susceptibility to antinomic dispute. Yet 
the reason why Kant argues for the a priori necessity of 
the ether as world-material is this: that dynamics composes 
being from actions, not things. As Kant writes, ‘the moving 
forces of matter are what the moving subject itself does to 
[other] bodies’.26 The twofold gambit of this claim, as of 
any transcendental naturalism, is that the transition from 
things to actions is sufficient both to avoid dogmatic traps 
concerning antithetical ontologies of things-in-themselves 
(are such disputes only possible between rival claims as to 
the nature of things?); and to integrate reason and nature 
into a single system susceptible to determination by free 
and self-constitutive acts (ontogenesis, categorial synthesis, 
etc.), now cast as causes. The problem is whether the tran-
scendental determination of nature is in fact a determination of nature 
at all, i.e., a determination ‘at once a priori and physically 
conditioned’,27 or merely a determination of the nature of 
Reason. If nature is not so determined, then things are not 
intellect-compliant, and dogmatism’s inconclusiveness or 
25. Kant, Ak. XXI, 216; Opus postumum, ed. and tr. Eckhart Förster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67.
26. Kant, Ak. XXII, 326; 1993: 110.
27. E. Förster in Kant, Opus postumum, xi, citing Ak.XXII, 138-9; Opus postumum: 46.
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revisability becomes the price to pay for the failure of the 
Copernican experiment. If it is, then the question is either: 
What kind of nature is it that is directly determinable in 
accordance, as Kant twice stipulates, with the ‘power of 
desire’ as cause?;28 or: What is the nature of reason such 
that it can so determine nature? 
It is freedom and/or reason, or their necessary combination, 
as Fichte was first to point out, that denaturalises as a 
precondition of nature as an objective of transcendental 
philosophy. Accordingly, transcendental anti-naturalism 
has its avatars: Heidegger, for instance, in On the Essence of 
Ground (1929), comparing the dogmatic with the transcen-
dental concept of ‘world’ in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and 
first Critique, respectively, concludes in strict accordance with 
the replacement of the dogmatist’s things with actions, that 
‘world never is, but worlds’.29 Thus ‘there are reasons’ why, 
Heidegger insists, ‘nature is apparently missing [from this 
account], not only nature as an object of natural science, but 
also nature in an originary sense’:30 nature is not original, 
but only appears as a determination of world for a form of 
attention paid to it.
While Heidegger’s remains a Copernican transcenden-
talism, Husserl’s 1934 work ‘Foundational Investigations 
of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: 
The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does not Move’ reverts 
to a more Cartesian, or Archimedean strategy. In a reprise 
28. Kant, Ak. V, 9n: Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L.W. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 
1993) and Ak.V 177 n., Critique of Judgment, op. cit., 16.
29. Heidegger, ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’ in M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. W. 
McNeill (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 126.
30. Ibid., 370 n. 59.
of the first of the antinomies of pure reason,31 the essay 
begins the search for a ‘a transcendental theory of natural 
scientific knowledge’32 by arguing against the ‘absurdity – 
indeed, the absurdity’ of naturalistic accounts of the origins 
of world, and for a world that is instead constituted by 
and for experience. Nature and its causes are not things, 
but ‘elaborated intuitions’, and for experience, indeed, as its 
condition, the Earth, even as a body, does not move. The 
paradox is alarming: what began with the Copernican 
revolution has returned, on transcendental grounds, to 
Ptolemaic geocentrism, to a ‘restitution of a sense of the 
earth as ground beyond Copernicus’, as Merleau-Ponty 
describes Husserl’s undertaking.33
Such transcendentalisms amplify their Kantian 
inheritance, and in particular the problem of whether a tran-
scendental naturalism can supply a naturalism at all. Asked 
following these latter examples, the answer would clearly be 
in the negative. For precisely this reason, the post-Kantian 
fate of the transcendental project reveals something about 
that project in turn – its susceptibility to antinomy:
31. CPR: A426/B454ff.
32. E. Husserl, ‘Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of 
the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does not Move’ (1934) in 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, trans. and ed. Leonard 
Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 117-
131: 117)
33. Ibid., 67.
THEsis 
Nature precedes 
the thinking it 
spawns
AntitHEsis 
Thinking 
precedes the 
Nature it thinks
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 What is important to note is that the antinomy revolves 
around the problem of ontological as opposed to conscious 
priority, just as Schelling’s thesis stipulates. A naturalistic 
ontological solution will therefore think this priority in 
terms of physical conditionality, while a transcendental 
anti-naturalist solution will, by contrast, think it in terms of 
the co-natality of Ich and nicht-Ich (Fichte), of experience and 
its ground (Husserl), or of the priority of projection over 
world (Heidegger). We will return to its solutions below.
The antinomy or ‘natural antithetic’ echoes either side 
of the transition in Kant’s own work from dogmatic to tran-
scendental naturalism. For example, the Universal Natural 
History provides reasons for the critical project that are 
themselves naturalistic:
If one looks for the cause of impediments, which keep human 
nature in such a deep debasement, it will be found in the 
crudeness of the matter into which his intellectual [geistige] part 
is sunk, in the unbending of the fibres and in the sluggishness 
and immobility of fluids which should obey its stirrings. The 
nerves and fluids of his brain deliver only gross and unclear 
concepts [...].34
In this light, Kant’s post-Copernican attention is 
directed not away from nature, but towards the nature of 
‘self-constituting’ reason’,35 a ‘natural dialectic’. In the above 
34. Kant, Ak. I, 356; 1981: 187.
35. ‘Transcendental philosophy is the autonomy of ideas, insofar as they form, 
independently of everything empirical, an unconditioned whole, and reason 
constitutes itself to the latter as a separate system’ (Kant, Ak. XXI, 79; Opus postumum, 
op. cit., 246). This is also clear from CPR, where Kant defines critical philosophy as 
that ‘science [which] has to deal […] only with itself and the problems which arise 
passage, nature clearly conditions thinking; while in the 
post-Copernican period, the causes of such impediments 
are found to ‘aris[e] from the very nature of our reason’.36 
Thus we have a first element, corresponding to criterion (1) 
above, in a definition of the dogmatism it is the Copernican 
project to supplant: 
D.1 Any philosophy is dogmatic whose theses can be antinomically 
disputed.37 
It follows from this that, if transcendental theses are 
susceptible to antinomy, their assertion is dogmatic. Since 
they are so susceptible, then it cannot be concluded that the 
Copernican revolution entails the elimination of dogmatism, 
which is why naturalism remains a problem for transcen-
dental philosophy. 
A second element towards a definition of dogmatism 
may also be drawn from Kant’s neuro-anatomical critique 
of human reason. It is clear from the above passage, as 
well as from other works of the 1750s and 60s, that the 
dogmatism at issue during the critical revolution is indeed 
any metaphysics that might support a dogmatic naturalism. 
On one view, the critique of such naturalism attests to 
Kant’s conversion to the ‘experimental method’ in the 
consideration of nature, leaving all a priori reasonings 
regarding nature blinded by their want of experimen-
tally derived intuitive content. On another, however, it is 
entirely from within itself, and which are imposed upon it by its own nature, not by 
the nature of things which are distinct from it’ (B23).
36. CPR: A669/B697.
37. ‘[The] dogmatic employment [of reason …] lands us in dogmatic assertions to 
which other assertions, equally specious, can always be opposed’ (CPR: B23).
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dogmatism that, though often overlooked, remains a crucial 
dimension in the struggles of the post-Kantian philosophers 
against the mechanistic materialism then migrating from the 
natural sciences into philosophy (hence Fichte’s constant 
complaints against Spinoza).
D.2 Any philosophy is dogmatic for which (physical) contingencies 
determine the possibilities of reason
It should be noted that D.2 adds to C.2 and 3, insofar as 
the latter stipulate that dogmatism locates the ground of 
being in things, which D.2 recasts in terms of determina-
bility. Thus, rather than rejecting the world of physically 
contingent states of affairs, transcendental naturalism will, 
on the above grounds, argue for the primacy of actions 
determining by free causes over objects determined in 
accordance with necessity.
2. tHE nECEssary inDEtErminaCy of BEing
The claim that dogmatism is in fact dogmatic naturalism 
is supported not only by Kant’s overt assertion that 
dogmatism always entails the assumption of the principle of 
(efficient) causality in its explanations,41 that is, of the things 
41. See, for example, Kant’s attempts to determine the causes involved in a putative 
alteration of the Earth’s axial rotation (Ak. I, 183-191) and of ‘The Age of the Earth, 
physically considered’ (Ak. I, 193-214). Critically reflecting on this proceedure in 
the Antinomy of pure reason, Kant writes: ‘the assertions of the thesis, on the other 
hand, presuppose, in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed within 
the series of appearances, intelligible [intellektuelle] beginnings; and to this extent 
its maxim is complex. But as its essential and distinguishing characteristic is the 
presupposition of intelligible beginnings, I shall entitle it the dogmatism of pure 
reason’ (CPR A466/B494). Finally, in the Critique of Judgment, Kant notes: ‘Now as 
we talk about the syustems that try to explain nature as concerns final causes, we 
must note carefully that the dispute among all of them is dogmatic – i.e., the dispute 
is about objective principles concerning the possibility of things, whether through 
causes that act intentially or only those that act unintentionally’ (Ak. V, 391).
not empty concepts, but the determination of causes that 
presents the problem. The Universal Natural History is clear 
that the causes of conceptual confusion are the materials 
from which the brain is composed. ‘Dogmatism in its pure 
form is materialism’, wrote Hegel.38 It is not that this must 
necessarily be wrong, but rather that the determination of 
the specific causes of contingent things is held to determine 
reason in turn. That is, if a contingent neural architecture 
(others are conceivable) is responsible for unclear concepts, 
then reasoning concerning concepts is duly inflected by 
such neurology. This is why the first Critique stipulates that 
while the proper means for ‘determining the limits of [all] 
possible knowledge’ are a priori, ‘when my ignorance is 
contingent [zufällig] it must incite me […] to a dogmatic 
enquiry concerning things (objects)’39 – precisely because 
it is the principle of the Copernican revolution that it is 
not objects that determine thought, but rather thought that 
determines objectality. Fichte makes the point explicitly:
It is by the principle of causality that dogmatism wishes to explain 
this nature of intelligence in general, as well as its particular 
determinations.40
This is extremely telling: not only does it clarify the reasons 
for Kant’s apparent abandonment of the geological, cosmo-
logical and mechanical investigations that preoccupied him 
during his precritical period, but specifies a dimension of 
38. G.W.F Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, ed. 
and trans. by H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (New York: SUNY, 1977), 126.
39. CPR: A758/B786.
40. Fichte, Werke  I, 436; The Science of Knowledge, ed. and tr. Peter Heath and John 
Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 17.
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‘whatever is, is, and whatever is not, is not’.44 The principle 
of identity is synthetic and necessarily true, but not a priori, 
insofar as the principle maintains the difference between 
being true of reason and being true of things.
The pertinence of Kant’s adoption of this Parmenidean 
couple45 consists in its abandonment of a single first principle, 
and its replacement with two such principles on the one 
hand, and their derived synthesis in the Principle of Identity on 
the other. This synthetic aspect is further borne out when 
we consider the place of existence [Dasein] and not-being 
[Nichtsein] in the first Critique’s Categories of Modality.46
taBlE of CatEgoriEs
I Of Quantity: Unity Plurality Totality
II Of Quality: Reality Negation Limitation
III Of Relation: Of Inherence 
and Subsistence
Of Causality and 
Dependence
Of Community 
(Reciprocity)
IV Of Modality: Possibility- 
Impossibility 
Existence- 
Nonexistence 
Necessity- 
Contingency
 In the considerations concerning the Table of Categories 
added in the B edition, Kant asserts that Modality and 
Relation belong to the dynamical categories, Quality and 
44. Kant, Ak. I, 389; Theoretical Philosophy, op. cit., 7.
45. Parmenides DK 28 B2: ‘the only ways of inquiry to be acknowledged are: one, 
that <that which is> is, and it is impossible for it not to be […] another, that It is 
not, and must needs not be – this, I tell you, is a path that is utterly indiscernible, 
for you could not know that which is not, for that is impossible, nor utter it’. I 
follow Cornford’s translation and insertion, Plato and Parmenides (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1939), 30-31. Importantly, Parmenides’ argumentation proceeds by 
antitheticals, a procedure that Plato’s Parmenides repeats and of which Kant’s dialectic 
is a direct heir.
46. CPR: A80/B106.
(cosa) which ground experience, but also by subsequent anti-
dogmatist philosophers, chief amongst whom is Fichte. Yet 
the rejection of causal explanations in metaphysics is only 
one element of a transcendental naturalism designed to 
replace it; an additional, ontological part of this programme 
derives from Kant’s critique of the primacy of the law of 
non-contradiction, initially presented in the New Elucidation 
(1755). Proposition I of that work states that ‘there is no 
unique, absolutely first, universal principle of all truths’.42 
The ground of this argument stems from the problems into 
which basic ontological propositions fall if the law of non-
contradiction is held to fulfil the office of such a principle. 
Drawing on Parmenidean propositions (what is, is; what is 
not, is not), Kant argues that any truly simple proposition 
must be either affirmative or negative. If the one, then 
not the other, and so neither can be universal, since an 
affirmative proposition cannot be the principle of a negative 
one, and vice-versa. Even the proposition that might be held 
indirectly to prove the above assertion false, namely, that 
‘everything of which the opposite is false, is true’,43 is itself 
an affirmative rather than a negative proposition; just as its 
antithesis, that is, ‘everything of which the opposite is true, 
is false’, is a negative one. Since neither can be derived from 
its antithesis, neither could have a foundation save in itself, 
from which it follows that there are two propositions, rather 
than one unique one. Moreover, from the combination 
of these two propositions the principle of identity is 
derived. Kant states this concisely in the following terms: 
42. Kant, Ak. I, 388; Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, trans. and ed. by David Walford 
and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6.
43. Ibid.
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Accordingly, ‘whatever is not not, is’50 avoids the trap of 
asserting the being of what is not, or of asserting  the being 
of ‘not-being’ (Parmenides’ ‘way of opinion’). 
Ontologically, the important consequence of both this 
Parmenidean and modal argumentation is that all predication 
is of what is and no predication can be of what is not. Being is 
not therefore a predicate, as the critical Kant will assert,51 
but rather that of which all predicates are predicates, the 
referent or Bedeutung of all predication, regardless of its 
Sinn.52 In other words, no information is or can be given as 
to what is: all that is specified concerning being is that it is 
impossible that it is not. This modal account is an important 
first element of the ontology transcendental philosophy 
presupposes but cannot own without reverting to 
dogmatism. The elucidation of this ontology will therefore 
[sive] nothing’ is true iff ‘you invest the sign of the negative concept with the power 
of cancelling [vim tollat] the affirmative concept’ (Ak. I, 390; 1992: 9). This power of 
cancellation, however, is precisely what the principle of contradiction presupposes, 
but that the principle of identity denies as active between assertions and negations. 
With no such power, nothing cannot derive from the combination of something with 
something that is not. The power of cancellation operates only between identicals, so 
that Kant rephrases the principle of identity thus: ‘whatever is not not, is’, where the two 
‘nots’ cancel each other out (Ak. I, 389; 1992: 8). In effect, Kant is arguing that the 
impossible is not nothing, but is impossible.
50. Kant, Ak. I, 389; Theoretical Philosophy, op. cit., 8.
51. CPR: A598/B626.
52. This elicits a dimension often overlooked in the Fregean account of the Bedeutungen 
of propositions. In ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’ (1892), Frege writes ‘all true sentences 
have the same Bedeutung” (in Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader [Oxford: Blackwell, 2000], 
159), namely, as the ‘Comments’ on that essay (1892) make clear, ‘the True’. Just 
as Kant claims all predication is of being, so Frege argues that since all propositions 
aim at the True, ‘thought and Being are the same’ (ibid., 174). Finally, in ‘Thought’ 
(1919), Frege generalizes this account to the classical Platonic triumvirate: ‘Just as 
“beautiful” points the way for aesthetics and “good” for ethics, so do words like 
“true” for logic’ (ibid., 325).
Quantity to the mathematical. The distinction is significant 
since the latter are concerned with objects of intuition and the 
former with their existence. In all cases, Kant notes, ‘the third 
category in each class always arises from the combination 
of the second category with the first’. According to the 
Categories of Modality, then, ‘necessity is just the existence 
which is given through possibility itself’.47 This reiterates 
what the New Elucidation has already affirmed: that existence 
is necessary and non-existence impossible.
Descending from the synthetic, while ‘all a priori division 
of concepts must be made by dichotomy’,48 the dynamical 
categories operate by dichotomous antitheses of concepts. On 
the scale of systems rather than concepts, the principle of 
identity explicitly sanctions extra-systemic contradictions 
between those that are affirmatively and those that are 
negatively grounded, setting up the problem the Transcen-
dental Dialectic examines between antinomic systems. To 
these formal concerns, the New Elucidation’s protocritical yet 
still dogmatic argumentation adds a material element: in 
keeping with its Parmenidean source, Kant draws expressly 
ontological consequences from the principle of identity. It is 
not the identity of any particular content that is established 
by the principle, but rather the primary differentiation of 
being from not-being, and therefore the identity of what 
is as what is. Both principles are self-identical, insofar as 
their contraries facilitate no derivation: ‘being is not’, 
that is, does not yield any derivables, not even nothing.49 
47. Ibid., B110-111.
48. Ibid., B110.
49. Kant expressly disputes that the product of a contradiction is nothing: ‘“+ A – A 
= 0”, [or i]n other words, affirming and negating the same thing is impossible or 
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are in this or that way that makes the proposition a tran-
scendental one, but the positing of things as this or that mode 
of existence (agit, facit, operatur, dirigit).56 That this is so will 
become especially evident not only in the Selbstsetzungslehre 
and the ‘Ether deductions’ of the Opus postumum, but also in 
Kant’s heirs’ (especially Fichte’s) accounts of the constitu-
tive or determining role of the act of positing with regard to 
the facts so posited. Against these Copernican credentials, 
the second sub-thesis automatically triggers accusations 
of dogmatism, at least insofar as the term applies to all 
metaphysics that takes as its object the determination of 
things ‘existing in themselves’. 
The question then concerns the relation between the 
two sub-theses; whether, that is, the first sub-thesis’s identi-
fication of being with positing is identical with or different 
from the second sub-thesis’s identification of positing 
and determination. If it is, then being is determinable in 
itself by positing; if not, then the being of the positing is 
not equivalent to the determination so posited. Note that 
from the thesis that being is what all predication is of, it 
follows that all predication must be the determination of 
being. Meanwhile, positing posits determinations as ‘existing 
in themselves’. It does not, that is, determine anything that 
exists in itself, but makes determinations exist in themselves. 
In effect, this is what a second constituent of Kant’s modal 
ontology stipulates: ‘I have been reproached’, Kant writes,
for defining the power of desire as the power of being the cause, 
through one’s presentations, of the actuality of the objects of 
56. ‘Nature causes (agit). Man does (facit). The rational subject acting with consciousness 
of purpose operates (operatur). An intelligent cause, not accessible to the senses, directs 
(dirigit).’ (Kant, Ak. XXI,18; Opus postumum, 224-5)
demonstrate that transcendentalism offers a new species of 
dogmatism in philosophy. 
We are not alone in affirming an ontology underlying 
the transcendental project. For example, Heidegger notes in 
his address to ‘Kant’s Thesis About Being’, that the thesis 
at issue does not affirm that beings or things are, and thus 
does not even inform us as to whether being is comprised 
solely of beings. All Kant’s thesis tells us is that ‘being is 
obviously not a real predicate’. Heidegger identifies this as 
the ‘negative thesis about being’.53 The ‘positive thesis’, by 
contrast, characterises being as
the positing of a thing, of certain determinations as existing in 
themselves. 54
From this we gain a sense of the dogmatism inherent in 
ontological determination, while at the same time the 
properly critical element is foregrounded. In this late 
analysis of Kant’s ontology,55 Heidegger takes the entirety 
of the above proposition as constituting the ‘positive 
assertion’, despite its containing two distinct – and perhaps 
antithetical – sub-theses: first, being is identified with 
positing; second, positing is identified not only with deter-
mination, but with determinations ‘as existing in themselves’. 
That the first sub-thesis fulfils the critical requirements of 
this ontology is evident from the positing: it is not that things 
53. M. Heidegger ‘Kant’s thesis about being’, op. cit.
54. CPR: A598/B626.
55. Heidegger’s first published examination of Kant’s ontology is Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics (1929, trans. by R. Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 
an analysis to which he returns in ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’ (1961) and What is a 
Thing? (1962, trans. by W. B. Barton and V. Deutsch, Chicago: Regnery, 1968). 
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Firstly, that the categories are to fulfil the ‘identity of subject 
and object’, that is, satisfy the speculative proposition, 
may seem like Hegel’s own imposition. Yet it is Kant who 
stipulates that, although the categories in general constitute 
‘all original pure concepts of synthesis that the understand-
ing contains within itself a priori’,59 the dynamical categories 
are in addition ‘concerned with existence’.60 With what 
existence? Categories or acts of thought that had no such 
effects could satisfy no subject-object or concept-intuition 
identity. In other words, although the categories cannot 
determine a priori the existence and specific differentia of 
particular matters, the categories of modality are nonetheless 
held to posit ‘determinations existing in themselves’. Yet 
we have seen how the transcendental philosophy demon-
strates the necessity attaching to existence as the ground for 
its determination, which extends, in the form of practical 
reason, to the determination of actuality (Wirklichkeit) as 
such. Why then does Hegel expressly deny this determi-
nation, asserting instead that Kant’s categories of modality 
‘determine nothing objectively’ and that ‘the nonidentity of 
subject and object essentially pertain to it’?
The criticism hinges on the claim that the categories 
of modality, qua categories of the understanding, are 
determining only of forms of thought, and thus provide a 
merely subjective determination of actuality. Hence it can 
be denied that anything is thereby determined objectively. 
Further, this is necessarily the case insofar as these categories 
are premised on the non-identity of subject and object, 
59. CPR: A80/B104.
60. Ibid., B110.
these presentations [die Definition des Begehrungsvermögens als 
Vermögens, durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache von der Wirklichkeit der 
Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein].57
Just as the thesis that all predication is of what is 
critically buttresses the New Elucidation’s modal proposition 
concerning being, viz., that it is impossible that it is not, so 
the thesis that being is a positing of determinations existing 
in themselves turns into an account of the determining 
causes of actuality. From this, we derive an initial statement 
of Kant’s ontology:
Being is necessarily indeterminate if actuality is determinable. 
Or, in practical terms:
The necessity of contingency is necessary for the determinability of the 
actual. 
It is precisely at this juncture that a comment Hegel makes 
in the Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of 
Philosophy with regard to Kant’s table of categories acquires 
significance as regards the investigation of a transcenden-
tal dogmatism. The framing of Hegel’s comment is, in this 
regard, especially instructive. In Kant’s deduction,
The identity of subject and object is limited to twelve acts of 
pure thought [reine Denkthätigkeiten] – or rather to nine only, for 
modality really determines nothing objectively; the nonidentity 
of subject and object essentially pertains to it.58
57. Kant, Ak. V, 177 n., citing Ak.V, 9 n.
58. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, op. cit., 80.
grant.indd   26-27 28/12/08   13:53:09
COLLAPSE V
28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Grant – Post-Copernican Dogmatism
29
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
categories can therefore be extended to objects as such, but 
only to actuality, by positing. If being has no ‘objective’ 
side, in what then does nature consist? Grasping the impli-
cations, it is Fichte who is Kant’s true heir, exactly as he 
claimed, when, in the Science of Knowledge, he characterises 
the object for the subject as the nicht-Ich, finally subjectivis-
ing all nature. ‘Is it true’ then, as Georges Cuvier asked his 
erstwhile professor of comparative anatomy, Carl Friedrich 
Kielmeyer, ‘as the Kantians seem to maintain’, that
external nature [...] may be deduced from a priori principles, 
i.e., those that are present prior to all experience […] – in short, 
from the nature of our minds[?]63
The problem is excellently posed: if there are principles 
prior to all experience, then  external nature emerges only 
after its subjective determination. Thus Hegel’s interven-
tion clarifies the ontology presupposed by transcenden-
talism, and articulates its dichotomous structure: nature 
cannot be objectively but only subjectively determined; 
therefore objective nature is of necessity objectively inde-
terminate in itself. By contrast, Cuvier’s problem suggests 
that it is only if the deduction of external nature is not the 
deduction of external nature that a subject-object dichotomy 
is conceivable. Rather than the subject-object pair, the 
Cuvier question (so like Jacobi’s challenge to Kant)64 
63. C. F. Kielmeyer, Natur und Kraft. Gesammelte Schriften, ed. F.H. Köhler (Berlin: 
Kieper, 1938), 236.
64. ‘The transcendental idealist […] must have the courage to assert the strongest 
idealism that has ever been taught, and not even to fear the charge of speulative 
egoism’ (F.H. Jacobi, ‘Realism and Idealism’, in B.Sassen (ed.), Kant’s Early Critics: 
the Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 175.
which the ontology supporting the Copernican revolution 
presupposes: the determination of reason is simply not the 
determination of things. In other words, if it is through 
the positing that ‘determinations exist in themselves’, then 
these determinations have existence only consequent upon 
their positing. Since, at the same time, no determinations 
can be made of things-in-themselves, then the categories of 
modality, especially those of existence and non-existence, 
‘determine nothing objectively’. 
While possessing no capacity for objective determi-
nation, the categories do nevertheless determine the only 
possible actions that speculative reason can perform, regardless 
of whether such performances obtain or are actualised. As we have 
seen, the transition to actuality is not an element of speculative 
reason, but a power only practical reason can effect. To 
effect is ultimately to determine actuality in accordance 
with freedom as the only unconditioned and necessary cause.61 
Accordingly, since it is a necessary presupposition of the 
Copernican revolution that being is determinable but not 
determining, being so determined is actuality: subjectiv-
ity remains impotent in being, but powerful in actuality.62 
The reason for this is the Copernican thesis that objects 
are determinable for reason while reason is not determina-
ble by objects, which entails that objective determination 
– that is, determination of existents anterior to determina-
tion – is impossible. Neither existence nor any of the other 
61. Ibid., A418-9/B446-7.
62. Kant was never as clear as Fichte about this: ‘if the Science of Knowledge should 
be asked, how then, indeed, are things-in-themselves constituted, it could offer no 
other answer save, as we are to make them. [… H]ence we can never speak of the 
existence of an object without a subject’ (Fichte, Werke I: 286; SK: 252).
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is characterised by its antithesis to freedom. ‘Nature determines 
itself’ must [accordingly] be translated into ‘nature is determined 
by its essence, formaliter, to determine itself’; nature can never 
be indeterminate, as a free being can very well be; and materi-
aliter too, nature is determined just in one way and no other; 
unlike a free being, it does not have the choice between a 
certain determination and its opposite.67 
Fichte here makes explicit the necessary indeterminacy 
of being that is merely implicit in Kant, and applies this to 
the production of a nature as formal and material being-deter-
mined. Accordingly, nature is formal and material determina-
bility. The determinable is never possibly not-determined, 
so that the empirical Ich can never not be determined in 
turn by determinacies it posits as its own limits. Empirical 
or living self-consciousness therefore sets itself as its task an 
unlimited striving to overcome these limits and increase the 
indeterminacy of or in being. 
Because striving takes time, and because it must be 
unlimited if it is a free striving rather than a determined and 
therefore merely natural drive, Hegel complains that rather 
than resolving the antithesis of nature and freedom, Fichte 
replaces it with an antithesis between ‘a limited present and 
an infinity extraneous to it’.68 Replacing an ‘absolute object’ 
with an absolute subject merely produces, notes Hegel, a 
‘dogmatic idealism’;69 antinomising it by way of a living 
self-consciousness generates no solution, therefore, to the 
antithesis of nature and freedom, but transposes the ground 
67. Fichte, Werke IV, 112-3; The System of Ethics, op. cit., 108.
68. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, op. cit., 139.
69. Ibid., 127.
works out the implications of the priority of thinking over 
being asserted by transcendental naturalism. Both sets of 
concerns, however, present an antinomy of transcendental 
naturalism: the opposability of transcendental to dogmatic 
naturalism, on the one hand, and the priority of thinking 
over being, on the other. Since these theses are opposable, 
transcendental ontology is dogmatic by criterion (1), above. 
Nevertheless, the core problem of the identity of reason and 
nature remains open. As for all dogmatisms, therefore, tran-
scendentalism is a naturalism concerned not with the deter-
mination of mind by nature, but with that of nature by free 
causes supported by necessary contingency. We will now 
examine both the Hegelian and the Cuverian Antinomies 
of Transcendental Naturalism in turn.
3. tHE antinomiEs of transCEnDEntal naturalism
i. tHE HEgElian antinomy 
Hegel presents an antinomy of transcendental naturalism 
in The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, 
through Fichte’s transcendental deduction of nature. The 
deduction is transcendental insofar as its starting point 
is the absolute Ich’s oppositing of nature to the empirical 
Ich, or the ‘self-limitation of free activity’.65 In other words, 
the differential between the absolute and the finite Ichs, or 
the degree to which the latter approximates the absolute 
identity of the former, provides the necessary conditions 
for thinking nature in accordance with the programme of 
the Science of Knowledge. Hegel66 cites Fichte postulating that 
nature
65. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, op. cit., 136.
66. Ibid., 137-8. 
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to overcome dichotomy. Yet Reason by its own nature is 
driven to maintain the dichotomy in and as its identity with 
the Absolute. The ‘speculative proposition’ that satisfies 
this need always and necessarily asserts identity with the 
Absolute (Frege’s Hegelianism), but never equivalence to it, 
so that the ‘identity of identity and dichotomy’ resolves the 
antinomy of finitude and extrinsic infinity.
Therefore it is a condition of Reason’s nature that it 
is both unconditioned by the dichotomy of freedom and 
nature, and maintains it. This is an important solution in 
three ways. Firstly, Hegel’s is a species of naturalised epistemo-
genesis in accordance, as both the Greater Logic and the Phe-
nomenology show, with living reason. Secondly, it is a largely 
forgotten solution to a problem that remains unresolved: 
namely, the relation of reason to nature, on the one hand, 
given the nature of reason on the other. Speculative 
idealism, in this regard, shares its concerns with philosophi-
cal inquiries regarding naturalised epistemology, neurophi-
losophy, and dialethism,73 amongst others. Thirdly, Hegel’s 
proposals do not resolve but amplify antinomy, making his 
a hyperdogmatism that remains undetermined with regard 
to nature or reason.
73. For naturalised epistemology, see W.V.O. Quine ‘Epistemology naturalized’ in 
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 
For neurophilosophy, see P. M. Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge: MIT, 
1986), 482: ‘so it is that the brain investigates the brain, theorizing about what brains 
do when they theorize’. Graham Priest, in Beyond the Limits of Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), defines dialethism as a transcendental investigation into the 
nature of true contradictions. 
of this antithesis outside itself, a subjectivity as objective 
and absolute as the object of dogmatic materialisms. This 
is borne out by Fichte’s the concept of ‘drive’, drawn from 
physiological researches into the nature of living beings. 
Thus, he writes:
The highest exhibition of intelligence outside itself, in nature, 
is the drive.70
Positing the drive as the highest exhibition of intelligence in 
nature – rather than, for example, the closest nature gets to 
exhibiting intelligence – therefore clearly exhibits transcen-
dental dogmatism’s maintenance of the dichotomy, while 
at the same time demonstrating the site of the struggle over 
determinacy versus purpose, between physics and ideality. 
Fichte reconstructs ethics as the direct conflict of matter and 
ideality, as the infinitely unresolvable struggle of embodied 
determinacy for absolute indetermination, and thus posits 
‘Nature [as] something essentially determined and lifeless’.71 
Nothing demonstrates more concretely this antinomy of 
transcendental naturalism than the ‘shock of the objective 
world’,72 or nature determined as absolute object.
Hegel’s own solution follows from a view of Kant’s 
transcendentalism he shares with Schelling. That is, 
when reason takes itself as its own object, transcenden-
tal philosophy is the investigation of the nature proper to 
reason. Accordingly, the Hegelian solution to the antinomy 
concerns the latter’s provocation of the need of philosophy 
70. Fichte, Werke XI, 363.
71. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, op. cit., 139.
72. Schelling, Werke I, 337.
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Considered along these lines, the powers or Vermögen 
of the first Critique, held responsible as they are for the 
existence or actuality of determinations, constitute a step 
towards supplanting bodies with forces in fundamental 
physics. This, for example, is how the medical scientist 
Andreas Röschlaub read Fichte, rendering the latter 
capable of a philosophy of medicine,75 and how the natural 
historian Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer reports the substance of 
Kant’s Copernican revolution to Cuvier:
This experiment of Kant’s is astute, and it recommends itself 
in that in this way, the necessary, the universal and the certain 
in our knowledge remains subjective in our mind, while the 
contingent and the particular will be attributed to objective 
nature, which is unknown in itself. 76
As for Kant, then, although he allows no naïve 
knowledge of nature ‘in itself’, Kielmeyer’s ontology is 
modal, consisting of what necessarily and what contin-
gently is. Objective nature is not nature-as-objects but as 
matter and, as matter, subject to further determination by 
forces. Here Kielmeyer joins Hegel in asserting that Kant 
does not go far enough (although for different reasons), 
for to turn matter, as the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science attempts to, solely into the product of attractive and 
repulsive forces, would have satisfied naturalistic demands 
75. Developing the theme of Idealist influences in their contemporaneous sciences, 
Tsouyopoulos (1978: 90) cites Röschlaub’s assessment of transcendental naturalism 
from the latter’s Magazine for the Improvement of Medicine vol.8, part 3 (1805): 473: ‘The 
philosophemes of a Kant, a Fichte and a Schelling have given the labours of the 
physician and the natural scientist a manifest and proper direction in our own day, 
just as the philosophemes of Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus and Aristotle did 
earlier’.
76. Kielmeyer, Natur und Kraft, op. cit., 243.
ii. tHE CuvErian antinomy
Let us then return to the indeterminacy of being thesis 
common to transcendentalism in general. If what is at stake, 
for Fichte, is the relative determinability of the Ich and its 
opposited ‘nature’; and if, for Hegel, it is the determina-
bility of all dichotomy by Reason’s nature that matters; 
transcendental philosophy has, in the ‘positing’ principle 
considered above, a naturalistic means for accounting for 
determination. We will first investigate this before pursuing 
the Cuverian antinomy of transcendental naturalism.
Positing is an act, the actualisation of a power in the 
world, subject to resistances and limitations. If nature or 
being is able to impose resistances and limitations upon sub-
jectivity, philosophy returns to pre-Copernican dogmatic 
naturalism. Thus the antidogmatic critique of causation 
consists in a refutation of its capacity to determine reason. 
To be so capable, a thing or cause (causa) would have to be 
ascribed powers; without a thing-in-itself as their possessor 
or vehicle, there remains only a set of powers. If a powers 
ontology is generalised, and if determination is a power of 
reason, then reason acts in one and the same world as do 
others. As Warnke notes, 
Actions are conceived by traditional metaphysics as the 
expressions of things. [Transcendentalism] stands this common 
view on its head [and] determines things as expressions of actions, 
objects as products of relations, being as a reified, objectified doing, 
exhausted in its product.74
74. C. Warnke, ‘Schellings Idee und Theorie des Organismus und der 
Paradigmawechsel der Biologie um die Wende zum 19. Jahrhundert’ in Jarhrbuch für 
Geschichte und Theorie der Biologie 5, 1998: 187-234, at 200.
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question raises precisely this prospect, we will restate the 
substance of Schelling’s account of it:
A transcendental naturalism based on powers may be 
held to supplant the problem of logical and real priority 
with that of reciprocity – powers are reciprocally, rather 
than mechanically or efficiently determined. Since, however, 
reciprocity is simply a time-cancelling version of Husserl’s 
co-natality thesis, this strand of transcendental naturalism 
is clearly dogmatic, in that it asserts a perfected equilibrium 
or static eternity of forces against the time-based antithesis 
of that view, as stated in the above antinomy. 
If being is necessarily indeterminate, then this indeter-
minacy must precede its determination, since the converse 
would entail that being is determinate in advance of its 
determination, thus defeating the transcendental gambit 
from the outset. From this, it follows that, once Kielmeyer’s 
Kant-derived powers ontology is added to it, not that being 
is inert and only acted upon by powers-possessors, since 
this would amount to a dogmatic reversion to things in 
themselves, but rather therefore that being itself is deter-
minability in accordance with powers. It is this, then, that 
gives Schelling his conviction concerning the priority of 
being over thinking, and Cuvier his scepticism concerning 
the priority of thinking over nature: Being is therefore 
potentiality for determinate being, Seynkönnen, rather than 
the object over which transcendental subjects struggle. 
on the first Critique without sacrificing transcendentalism. 
According to Kielmeyer, however,
Kant neither achieved this, and nor, although he ought to, 
would he want to; the proof is still wanting that all qualititative 
differences in matter are simply and immediately differences in 
the quantitative relations between the attractive and repulsive 
forces. I would very much like to see this proof undertaken and 
the qualities of matter explained from these two forces without 
the intervention of a tertium, whether this be God, atoms, or 
some third force.77
So Kielmeyer demands that the powers hypothesis become 
an objective ontology. What we are left with now, however, 
are two accounts of transcendental naturalism: in one, 
the necessary indeterminacy of being is maintained at 
the cost of anything other than the subjective determi-
nation of actuality; in the other, forces supply a unified 
and speculative ontogenetic account of the material of 
knowledge, or objectivity. However, to complete this as 
an account of Transcendental Naturalism, an additional 
element must be added to the powers thesis, namely, the 
ontological thesis regarding the necessary indeterminacy – 
and therefore determinability – of being. It is with this in 
mind that we turn finally to the Cuverian Antinomy.
The Cuverian Antinomy is also Schelling’s, and 
concerns priority and posteriority in relations of determi-
nation. Where Cuvier asks whether external nature can be 
deduced according to principles of mind prior to experience, 
Schelling asserts that being precedes thinking and not the 
converse. Since the implicit antinomic contrary in Cuvier’s 
77. Ibid., 245.
THEsis 
Nature precedes 
the thinking it 
spawns
AntitHEsis 
Thinking 
precedes the 
Nature it thinks
grant.indd   36-37 28/12/08   13:53:11
COLLAPSE V
38
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Grant – Post-Copernican Dogmatism
39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
the topics and interlocutors addressed therein. Accordingly, 
I will conclude by drawing out some implications of  powers 
ontologies.
Firstly, powers necessarily involve modal concepts. 
Against Hegel’s denial that the categories of Modality 
determine anything objective, objectality is nothing other 
than a set of potentials for actualisation, as Plato insisted. 
Powers make contingency into an ontology, a metaphysics 
and a physics.
Secondly, and again emphasising contingency, powers 
necessarily involve time determination, not as the tran-
scendental form of inner sense, but, as Johann Heinrich 
Lambert noted, as determining change: ‘If changes are real, 
then time is real [...]. If time is unreal, then no change can be 
real’.79 Of course, this does not mean that the nature of time 
is given in advance as linear, as again physicists remind us.
Thirdly, powers do constitute a dogmatically assertible 
transcendental field insofar as they are both necessary to 
determination and in and of themselves indeterminate.
Fourthly and finally, the prospects for dogmatism are 
raised wherever the certainties of transcendental reflection 
are revealed not as another species of reason, but rather as 
dogmatism parochialised: 
Being is necessarily indeterminate if actuality is determinable. 
Or, in practical terms:
The necessity of contingency is necessary for the determinability of the 
actual. 
79.  Lambert to Kant, October 13th 1770, in Kant Ak. X, 107.
The Schelling-Cuvier antinomy thus results, its tran-
scendental condition-giving notwithstanding, in a dogmatic 
naturalism premised on the multiple determinability of 
being. Finally, therefore, transcendental naturalism is either 
a dogmatic naturalism of the Cuvier-Schelling-Kielmeyer 
type, or simply naturalism – or it is not a naturalism at all, 
like those of Fichte, Heidegger and Husserl. Copernican-
ism does not eliminate dogmatism, but continues it in new 
forms – a dogmatism of appearance as opposed to that of 
essence, as has been recently made crystal clear by Béatrice 
Longuenesse: 
It is a fact that we live in a world of things. Still, we must 
understand that these things are our fact, our doing – not in the 
sense that a philosophy of praxis would give to this statement 
[...] but in the sense of a metaphysical account of the world as 
constituted by a process of thinking.78 
Just as this dogmatism of appearances resulted from Kant’s 
experiment in thought, it remains true of transcendentalism 
now, and prompts a challenge to those who pursue tran-
scendental philosophy – to demonstrate that theirs is not 
simply a dogmatic anti-naturalism.
In conclusion, the ontology of powers, with its modal 
determinations (necessity, contingency, possibility, 
actuality), can only be regarded as a reducibly metaphysi-
cal problem if the physical dimensions of its actuality are 
ignored. Field ontology entered physics and philosophy 
at the same time, although its philosophical pedigree is 
perhaps longer, stretching back at least to Plato’s Sophist and 
78. Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 6.
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